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Abstract - Classical rationality as accepted by game 
theory assumes that a human chooser in a given moment 
has consistent preferences and beliefs and that actions 
result consistently from those preferences and beliefs, and 
moreover that these preferences, beliefs, and actions 
remain the same across equal choice moments.  Since, as is 
widely found in prior experiments, subjects do not follow 
the predictions of classical rationality, behavioral game 
theorists have assumed consistent deviations from classical 
rationality by assigning to subjects certain dispositions—
risk preference, cognitive abilities, social norms, etc.  All 
of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories, 
making claims about how individual human minds work 
when choosing.  All of them are fundamentally wrong in 
assuming one kind of consistency or another.  Or at least, 
all of the proposals for consistency in belief, preference, 
and action with which we are aware turn out to be wrong 
when tested experimentally.  
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1  Introduction   
  Game theoretic models are utilized for behavioral 
predictions across a variety of domains such as allocation 
of security forces [1], allocation of health care services [2], 
and the design of political, social and market institutions 
[3; for relevant surveys see: 4, 5, 6, 7]. Despite the 
widespread use of game theoretic models to explain human 
behavior, we often observe behavior, from voting, to the 
divergence of political parties platforms, to market bubbles 
and crashes that do not readily accord with the predictions 
derived from game theory [8].  
  To address the discrepancy between predicted and 
actual behavior, scholars have proposed four common 
patches: (1) cognitive biases or errors in how people make 
decisions [9, 10, 11, 12]; (2) a mismatch between the 
experimenter’s defined payoffs and an individual’s actual 
utility [13, 14]; (3) the effects of uncertainty, bounded 
search ability, limited time for learning and equilibration, 
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or limits in the ability of thinking about others’ likely 
behavior [15]; and (4) newer and more clever equilibrium 
refinements that capture the folk psychology of different 
game theorists [16, 17, 18, 19].   
  While it is common to report that experimental 
subjects do not make choices that comport with Nash 
equilibrium strategies (or even von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility maximization), we should not infer that human 
reasoning is thus somehow flawed.  It is perhaps the case 
that our existing, deductive, models of human reasoning 
are too limited. Humans are able to solve many tasks that 
are quite difficult [20, 21]. Like vision, taste and smell, 
human intelligence and behavior are varied and flexible, 
creating an enormous diversity of beliefs and choices, but 
the models that we use to predict behavior do not and 
cannot capture this diversity. To build a better theory of 
human behavior, we must start with an appreciation for 
how we actually reason.  As cognitive science has shown, 
intuitive notions of how the mind works (vision, language, 
memory, etc.) may be very useful for humans to hold as 
scaffolding for consciousness, but they are 
comprehensively wrong and simplistic. Intuitive notions of 
how we reason are not a basis for science.  How we reason 
must be discovered, not assumed, and certainly not 
borrowed from intuition 
 One of the principal problems stems from the core 
solution strategy for noncooperative games of Nash 
equilibrium. While it is mathematically elegant, it requires 
agents in the game to have correct and consistent beliefs 
[22]. To have “correct beliefs” we assume that the agents, 
or the players in a game, to regard all other players as 
being “Nash players” and to predict that they all follow 
Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies. It is also typically 
required that players have “common knowledge” that they 
are all Nash players, that is, that they know that other 
players know that they themselves are following Nash 
equilibrium strategies, and so on, ad infinitum.  Others 
have pointed out that “Common Nash refinements have 
similar attributes. Although these refinements differ in 
what they allow players to know and believe, they continue 
to require that actors share identical conjectures of other 
players’ strategies” [23, p. 106].  If players do not believe 
that other players will adopt NE strategies, however, it is 
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no longer true that players’ best response to each other will 
be to follow a NE strategy. The natural, biological, or 
cognitive means by which this comes about are not 
specified, merely that, given enough time and effort, 
players can all learn what behaviors to adopt and when to 
adopt them, or, baring this eventuality, that societies will 
adopt rules, laws or norms to restrict and channel behavior 
to more efficient forms.  Prior work on subjects’ beliefs in 
experimental settings suggest that subjects possess non-
equilibrium beliefs [24, 25] and that in at least some 
settings their behavior can be reasonable, given their 
beliefs [26].  
  In what follows, rather than trying to stitch together 
measurements from different experiments, with different 
protocols, run under different conditions and at different 
times, we use a within-subjects design, run over a single 
academic term, to investigate choices in a large battery of 
single-shot games.  Within our battery of tasks we elicit 
subjects’ beliefs about the other subject’s actions, plus we 
elicit recursive beliefs about other subjects’ beliefs in these 
games.  We demonstrate that subjects’ actions and beliefs 
are consistently inconsistent, deviating from one person to 
another and for each person from one task to another. A 
given subject is often not consistent in action across nearly 
identical choice moments at different times in the same 
within-subject battery of tasks and a given subject is often 
not consistent even at the same time in their beliefs, 
preferences and actions. We also see great variation across 
subjects for a given task. For our specific battery, this 
refutes not only Nash equilibrium but also the patches that 
have been designed to explain deviation from it.  
 
2  Experimental Design 
  We report on a number of tasks here related to the 
well-known Trust Game [27]. In our experiments, subjects 
know that their choices are always private and anonymous, 
even to the experimenters at the time of the experiment 
(i.e., double blind). Subjects receive no feedback during 
the course of the experiment about the consequences of 
their choices, except for quizzes related to the given tasks 
(subjects may, for some of our tasks, be able to infer the 
consequences of their choices). For each task, subjects are 
randomly matched to another subject.  Thus, to the extent 
possible, every task is a single shot, separate from the prior 
and future choices.  Subjects are divided into two rooms, in 
groups of ten in each room.  We ensure that no subject 
knows anyone else in either of the two rooms of the 
experiment. As much as possible, then, this environment 
creates a situation in which subjects derive their utility 
solely from the payoffs in the experimental tasks and not 
from concerns about reputation, signaling for future games, 
experimenter demand, or other actions that are not related 
to the immediate monetary payoffs we present.  
  The Trust Game (sometimes called the investment 
game) involves two players. Each player begins with a $5 
endowment.  The first player (Player 1 or the “Investor” 
[27]) chooses how many dollars, if any, to pass to an 
anonymous second player (Player 2 or “Trustee” [27]). In 
our experimental protocols, we use no labels other than 
“the other person(s)” (to avoid a gaming frame). To avoid 
suggesting an investment or reciprocity frame we label 
each action as a “transfer.” The first player keeps any 
money he does not pass. As in [27], the money that is 
passed is tripled in value and the second player receives the 
tripled amount. The second player at that point has the 
original endowment of $5 plus three times the amount the 
first player passed, and decides how much, if any, of that 
total amount to return (i.e., transfer) to the first player. The 
second player at the moment of choice in the Trust Game 
is in a role that is equivalent to the role of Dictator in the 
classic Dictator Game [see 8]. As in the Dictator Game, the 
dominant strategy equilibrium, which is trivially the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), is that Player 2 
will return $0. By backward induction, then Player 1 in the 
Trust Game will send $0. This is also a dominant strategy.  
As such, any amount sent by Player 1 to Player 2 should be 
viewed by Player 1 as a donation, and we label the first 
half of the Trust Game as what we call a Donation Game. 
  These equilibrium strategies derive from the 
assumption is that all players maximize their monetary 
payoff and that they believe that all other players do the 
same.  In the Trust Game, a Player 1 with these beliefs 
would conclude that Player 2 will return nothing and so, as 
a maximizer, Player 1 sends nothing.   The beliefs that 
players hold about other players lead to the belief at every 
level of recursion that all players will send $0, and that 
they will guess that others will send $0, and they will guess 
that others will predict that everyone will send $0, and so 
on, ad infinitum.   
 But what happens if a subject with these NE beliefs 
finds himself off the equilibrium path?  In the Trust Game, 
only Player 2 could make a choice after finding himself or 
herself presented with an off-the-equilibrium-path choice.  
If Player 2 is gifted with anything more than his or her $5 
endowment, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
strategy is still to send $0 back.   
  Every subject makes decisions first as Player 1.  They 
are then randomly paired with someone from the other 
room and they make choices as Player 2. So everyone gets 
to be Player 1 first, then Player 2, about 90 minutes later.  
To limit learning, even if it is just learning about the 
actions of a randomly assigned partner in another room, we 
defer the choices for all subjects as Player 2 to the end of 
the experiment. They thus play Trust twice, but in different 
roles. Player 1 never learns the consequences of any of his 
or her choices in the Trust Game.  Player 2 can of course 
infer the consequences of his or her own choices. 
  We add elements to the basic Trust Game to tap into 
subjects’ beliefs. Our belief elicitation mechanism borrows 
from the idea of a prediction market [28], which in 
experimental settings such as those described here have 
been referred to as “scoring rules” [29, 30, and for a brief 
survey see 8]. We do not ask subjects to report their 
expectations, as some experimenters have done, in order to 
prod strategic thinking, rather, we ask them to “guess” 
other subjects’ choices, or to guess other subjects’ 
“predictions.”  As with all of our protocols, we try to 
provide little or no framing of the experimental tasks 
offered to our subjects.  Only after Player 1 makes his 
choice about how much to transfer, do we ask him to guess 
how much Player 2 will return.  We then elicit Player 1’s 
recursive beliefs about Player 2.  So, we next ask Player 1 
to guess what Player 2 will later predict how much Player 
1 is transferring. We further ask Player 1 to guess Player 
2’s prediction of Player 1’s guess of how much Player 2 
will return.  We also elicit each subject’s recursive beliefs 
when they are in the role of Player 2.  Before Player 2 
learns Player 1’s choice, and thus before Player 2 knows 
how much they have available to them, we ask Player 2 to 
guess how much money Player 1 transferred.  We also ask 
Player 2 to guess how much Player 1 predicted that Player 
2 would guess that Player 1 transferred.  After Player 2 
learns Player 1’s transfer, we ask Player 2 to guess how 
much Player 1 predicted she would return. All subjects 
know that all subjects earn $3 for each correct guess and 
earn nothing for a guess that is wrong.  All subjects in our 
experiments know this.  We also allowed subjects to, in 
essence, “double-down,” on each guess, adding a second 
“bet” equal to $3 if they are correct in their guess and $0 
otherwise.  We also always quizzed our subjects with 
respect to the instructions, paying them for correct 
answers.   
  In calibrating these prediction questions prior to the 
launch of our experiments we learned two things: (1) that 
there does not exist an easy language for eliciting recursive 
beliefs, so we made use of generic cartoon “heads” to 
represent what subjects are predicting and “$” sign and 
arrow icons to represent actions and the object of their 
current attention; and (2) subjects laughed and failed to 
answer our queries, even when diagrammed in cartoon 
form, with written explanations.  These two preliminary 
findings suggested to us that people really do not have the 
recursive beliefs required by NE. 
  The questions we ask vary slightly for each task, but 
as an example, here is the exact question we ask Player 2: 
“How much money do you guess the other person 
transferred to you? If you guess correctly, you will earn $3. 
If not, you will neither earn nor lose money.” We add 
similar incentivized prediction tasks to various 
experimental tasks. Players do not learn whether their 
predictions were right or wrong and subjects never have 
any information about other subjects’ guesses.   
  Subjects also make decisions in a variety of other 
games, including the already mentioned Dictator Game and 
what we call the Donation Game. In both these games, 
each subject is randomly paired with yet other subjects in 
the other room.  In the Dictator Game, The Dictator (Player 
1) and the Receiver (Player 2) have endowments identical 
to those the subjects had when they were in the role of 
Player 2 and Player 1 in Trust (although they have been 
randomly rematched and they known they’ve been 
randomly rematched).  Accordingly, the Dictator Game 
was identical right down to the specific endowments to the 
second half of the Trust Game. In effect, each subject 
replayed the second half of the Trust Game, but now 
without the reciprocity frame. The SPNE is for the Dictator 
to send $0 to the Receiver.  The Donation Game is 
identical, except that each player begins with a $5 
endowment and the amount Player 1 chooses to send is 
quadrupled before it is given to Player 2 (making it roughly 
similar but not identical to the choice faced by Player 1 in 
the Trust Game, without the possibility of reciprocity).  
The dominant strategy and SPNE is again for the Donor to 
send $0. 
   The subjects in our experiment completed the tasks 
using pen and paper in a controlled classroom 
environment. Subjects were recruited using flyers and 
email and text messages distributed across a large public 
California university and were not compelled to participate 
in the experiment, although they were given $5 in cash 
when they showed up and signed in. A total of 180 subjects 
participated in this experiment. The experiment lasted 
approximately two hours, and subjects received on average 
$41 in cash.  The experiment was followed sometime later 
with a questionnaire, for which subjects were also paid.   
3  Result: Subjects’ Beliefs in the 
Trust Game 
  Common patches to help explain the commonly 
observed departures to NE strategies (other-regarding 
preferences, cognitive constraints, decision-making biases, 
or equilibrium refinements) usually continue to maintain 
the assumption that players deviate from game-theoretic 
expectations in consistent ways.  For example, if players 
prefer to reduce inequality, that preference should be stable 
across all manner of economic games [10]. Or, if players 
cannot perform backward deletion of dominated sub-
games, as game theory requires, then this handicap should 
operate in all game environments of equal difficulty [17, 
18, 19]. In this section we focus both on whether subjects 
have beliefs that are consistent with SPNE and whether 
their beliefs are consistent across tasks (regardless of 
alignment with SPNE). To date, there has been little focus 
on identifying the extent to which players have consistent 
beliefs or behavior across games.  
  Cognitive science gives us considerable reason to 
doubt that players will behave identically across different 
environments, because changes in environment lead to 
changes in mental activation, which affects beliefs and 
behavior.  As Sherrington famously wrote, the state of the 
brain is always shifting, “a dissolving pattern, always a 
meaningful pattern, though never an abiding one” [32]. If 
the particular tasks, and order of those tasks, induce 
different mental activations, then belief and behavior 
should vary accordingly.  Our experiment is designed to 
shed light on whether subjects have consistent beliefs and 
make consistent choices. 
  In many of our tasks, we ask subjects to make guesses 
about other players’ actions and predictions. Do subjects 
believe what game theory assumes they believe?  The 
answer is that there is huge variance across what subjects 
believe in a single game and also huge variance within 
subjects from one task to another.  
  The SPNE in the Trust Game is that neither Player 1 
nor Player 2 will send any money to the other.   All should 
believe that all others will predict that no one will send 
money, and all such beliefs should be infinitely recursive, 
so that Player A believes Player B believes Player A 
believes Player B will send no money, and so on for any 
number of steps and for any subject in any role A or B.   
  But we see quite the contrary in our experiments: only 
68 of 180 subjects as Player 2 believe that Player 1 will 
send nothing. In other words, 62% of subjects have 
“incorrect” beliefs, that is, beliefs contrary to those that 
support SPNE strategies.     
  Next we examine the guesses made by Player 1 of the 
amount Player 2 will return.  In what follows, we include 
even the Player 1s who sent nothing. (Since Player 2 
begins with a $5 endowment, Player 2 can transfer money 
even if Player 1 sent nothing.)  Ninety-two of the 180 
subjects guess that Player 2 will return $0, but 88, or 49%, 
believe that Player 2 will return some money.  This means 
that 49% of these subjects have “incorrect” beliefs.  Their 
beliefs diverge broadly from SPNE, across a large span of 
possible returns.  
  We can compare subjects’ beliefs about others in one 
part of the Trust Game with their choices in that same part 
of the Trust Game. For example, we can examine the 
difference between what a subject choose to do as Player 1 
in the Trust Game, and what they believe as Player 2 that 
Player 1 will do (and recall, when they are Player 2, 
they’ve already made choices as Player 1).  The modal 
category is subjects believe that other subjects will play 
like them: 109 of the 180 subjects guess that the choice of 
the Player 1 with whom they are randomly matched will be 
the same as their own choice when they were Player 1. For 
these subjects, theory of mind might equal theory of self, 
or this may simply represent the “false consensus” effect in 
which people think others are more like them than they 
actually are [31], or it might be akin to the curse of 
knowledge, but we can’t really tell. Perhaps most 
surprising, there is a large variance, with 71 subjects (39%) 
making guesses that differ from their own choices. 
  We can also examine the number of subjects who 
have beliefs consistent with NE across tasks. In the Trust 
Game, subjects make predictions as Player 1 about the 
behavior of Player 2 and as Player 2 about the behavior of 
Player 1. We already demonstrated that in either single 
task, a great many subjects do not have SPNE beliefs. If 
Player 1 has NE beliefs, it means that this subject guessed 
that Player 2 would return nothing. If Player 2 has NE 
beliefs, it means that the subject guessed that Player 1 
would send nothing. Overall, out of 180 subjects in our 
analysis, only 63 subjects made guesses as both Player 1 
and 2 that were consistent with NE beliefs. In other words, 
only 35% of our subjects have consistently “NE beliefs” 
even inside this one game.   
 There were 83 subjects who lacked NE beliefs in both 
part of the Trust Game, 29 subjects who possessed “NE 
beliefs” as Player 1 but not as Player 2, and only 5 subjects 
who possessed “NE beliefs” as Player 2 but not as Player 
1. Our experiment does not allow us to identify why 
players’ beliefs diverge from the NE beliefs, but it is clear 
that most subjects deviate from NE beliefs during at least 
one of the experimental tasks.  
  There were 60 subjects who were “fully Nash actors” 
in the Trust Game, that is, the subjects whose actions as 
both Player 1 and 2 were consistent with SPNE strategy. 
We examine whether these 60 subjects have beliefs that are 
“fully Nash” in the Trust Game. The answer is no. First, let 
us consider these 60 subjects in the role of Player 1 in 
Trust.  Of these 60 subjects, 56 guessed as Player 1 that 
Player 2 would return nothing, which is consistent with 
SPNE. Only 40 of the 60 “fully Nash” Trust players (66%) 
guessed that Player 2 predicted that they would transfer $0.  
The other 20 of the 60 “fully Nash” Trust players (1/3rd) 
lacked that SPNE belief. 49 of the 60 also guessed Player 
2’s prediction of Player 1’s guess of what Player 2 will 
return to be $0. These results show that even the 60 “fully 
Nash” Trust subjects hold beliefs whose degree of 
consistency with SPNE principles varies question by 
question even when we look at only those questions asked 
of them when they are in the role of Player 1.  Beliefs show 
flexibility.  
  We next turn to the beliefs of those 60 “fully Nash” 
Trust subjects when they are in the role of Player 2 in 
Trust.  Of the 60, 44 guess that Player 1 will transfer 
nothing; that is, 16 of 60 (27%) lack SPNE beliefs.  Of the 
60, 35 guess that Player 1 predicts that they will return 
nothing; that is, for this question, 42% of these 60 “fully 
Nash” Trust subjects have beliefs that are inconsistent with 
SPNE. Overall, non-SPNE beliefs are quite common even 
among the 60 “fully Nash” actors in the Trust Game.  
Beliefs show flexibility and refute the assumed beliefs of 
Nash equilibrium and the four patches often applied to NE.  
4  Result: Inconsistency of Behavior in 
Trust, Donation, and Dictator 
  We turn next to examine the actions of subjects across 
a number of similar tasks to see if individual subjects 
behave consistently.  In particular, we look at a set of tasks, 
all of which involve choosing how much money to transfer 
to another person and in some tasks the decision is not 
contingent on the other player. In the Trust Game, subjects 
play the role of Player 1 and 2 during the course of the 
experiment.  
  One way to investigate consistency of behavior is to 
examine the choices of subjects who as Player 2 in Trust 
received money from Player 1.  Of the 100 subjects who 
received money as Player 2 in Trust, only 62 returned any 
of the money to Player 1. Additionally, of those 62, only 
40 sent money in the Dictator Game, which is identical to 
the percentage of subjects who sent nothing in other 
“double blind” versions of the Dictator Game [13]. This 
shows that many subjects do not behave consistently in 
these two identical choice situations, in which their actions 
could reduce inequality. Further, of the 40 who sent money 
in Dictator, only 29 also send money in the Donation 
Game. This means that of the 100 subjects who received 
money as Player 2 in Trust, only 29 sent money to the 
other player in all three related tasks. This shows that the 
same subjects do not behave consistently even in their 
violations of SPNE.  
  Another example of apparently inconsistent behavior 
comes from examining the subjects who passed $0 out of 
$5 in the Donation Game, suggesting they are not 
concerned with others’ earnings. Of the 87 subjects who 
passed $0 in the Donation Game, 63 of them also passed 
nothing as Player 1 in the Trust Game, both behaviors of 
which are consistent with standard game theoretic 
behavior. However, the other 24 subjects passed $0 in the 
Donation Game and some amount greater than $0 in the 
Trust Game. What model predicts this behavior? Why 
would a player who passes nothing in the Donation Game 
pass money in the Trust Game? One possibility is that the 
player believes that passing money in Trust will result in 
greater earnings, because Player 2 will return enough 
money to make the choice to pass money financially 
beneficial. However, among these 24 subjects some guess 
they will earn money in the Trust Game and others guess 
they will lose money. The lack of consistency in these two 
very similar settings is further evidence that assumptions of 
consistent behavior are at odds with much human action.   
  Subjects deviate remarkably from NE strategies.  We 
have reported how subjects’ beliefs deviate from those 
necessary to support equilibrium strategies.   We have also 
shown that these deviations are not consistent.  
Accordingly, it is doubtful that proposals to explain 
deviation from NE strategies will succeed if they presume 
a consistent mental or behavioral signature.    
  Now, we ask whether actions are minimally rational, 
that is, do subjects’ actions accord with their beliefs?  To 
begin, we investigate whether action and belief accord in 
the Trust Game.  In our experiment, over one-half of 
subjects in the role of Player 1 (100 out of 180) pass a 
nonzero amount of money to Player 2 (this differs from 
[27]), which is inconsistent with a SPNE strategy, and on 
average subjects pass $1.44 (which is not significantly 
different than the findings in [27]). Of the 100 subjects 
who receive money as Player 2, 62 of them return some 
money to Player 1.  On net, Player 1 loses money (our 
results here are almost identical to those by [27]).  
  To look at the relationship between beliefs and actions 
we examine the difference between the amount Player 1 
sends to Player 2 and the amount Player 1 guesses Player 2 
will return.  Recall that any money sent by Player 1 is 
tripled before it is sent to Player 2 and added to Player 2’s 
initial $5, (e.g., if Player 1 sends all $5, then Player 2 has 
$20, and if Player 2 splits that money, then Player 1 and 
Player 2 end with $10 each, and we would say that each 
has “earned” $5 through their actions).  Overall, there are 
only a few players who guess that they will lose money by 
sending money to the other player. Mostly, players expect 
to break even or benefit slightly from their decision. The 
beliefs held by these players imply not only that they do 
not expect others to play consistently with SPNE 
strategies, but also that they expect, on average, to profit 
from their non-SPNE strategy to send money. But again, 
beliefs are not consistent across subjects. 
  There are 100 subjects who as Player 1 in Trust chose 
to send a positive amount to Player 2, and 20 of those 
players guess they will not receive anything in return. 
These 20 players guess that Player 2 will follow a SPNE 
strategy.  These 20 subjects cannot simultaneously be 
maximizing their payoffs and hold the belief that Player 2 
will follow a SPNE strategy of returning $0 so it is hard to 
see how their choices accord with their own beliefs. We 
must either conclude that they are not payoff maximizers 
or relax the assumption that subjects act according to 
beliefs.  One possible response is to give up the assumption 
that believing, preferring, deciding, and acting are 
coordinated mental events.  Perhaps subjects act without 
fully activating their decisions, or believe without 
activating the consequences of those beliefs for action, or 
act without activating beliefs, and so on.     
  These results make it clear that we may not be able to 
simply observe behavior and then make correct inferences 
about the underlying beliefs that generated the behavior. 
When we observe a Player 1 in the Trust Game pass 
money what beliefs do we presume preceded that 
behavior? Is this a subject who is motivated by other-
regarding preferences who does not expect to benefit 
financially? Or, is this a player who sincerely believes that 
the 2nd player in the Trust Game will return enough money 
to make the initial decision profitable?  
  There were 60 subjects who were “fully Nash actors” 
throughout the game; that is, they chose SPNE strategies 
(i.e., $0) as both Player 1 and Player 2., We ask whether 
these 60 “fully-Nash” actors in Trust are “fully Nash” in 
the related Donation and Dictator Games.  Of these 60 
subjects, 57 pass $0 in the Dictator Game and 50 of the 60 
pass $0 in the Donation Game. If we focus on those 57 
subjects who are “fully Nash actors” as both Player 1 and 
Player 2 in Trust and also as Dictator in the Dictator Game, 
we find that 48 of the 57 pass nothing in the Donation 
Game. Therefore, across our entire subject pool, only 48 
(27%) have consistent NE behavior in three related games 
of Trust, Donation, and Dictator.  
  Although deviations in a single game have been 
widely recognized, research has not focused on how 
behavior across games is related. We have shown in a 
variety of ways that NE-consistent behavior in one task 
does not guarantee similar behavior in another setting. 
Therefore, even accurately predicting a subjects’ action in 
one setting is no guarantee that it is possible to predict 
accurately the subjects’ action in another setting. We 
demonstrate thisusing game theoretic environments that are 
exceedingly similar, which would seem to stack the deck in 
favor of finding consistent behavior across games. 
However, the results from our battery of experimental 
tasks demonstrate that subjects regularly deviate from 
SPNE in both their beliefs and behavior, that the deviations 
are themselves inconsistent, and that there is variation in 
the degree to which behavior accords with belief.   These 
deviations are so pervasive and the variation so large, even 
among subjects taking actions in similar or identical 
strategic settings, that is seems unwarranted to refer to 
them as “deviations.” On the contrary, even though our 
subject pool is derived from subjects with very high math 
SATs, who were on the whole in the top 2% of high school 
graduates, consistent “NE behavior and beliefs” appear to 
be remarkable deviations from human cognitive patterns 
and human behavior.   
5  Discussion 
  Games are defined by seven characteristics: players, 
actions, information, strategies, payoffs, outcomes, and 
equilibria, including equilibrium refinement [33].   
Equilibria must be mutually consistent, indeed, “[T]he 
Nash equilibrium (NE) concept . . . entails the assumption 
that all players think in a very similar manner when 
assessing one another’s strategies. In a NE, all players in a 
game base their strategies not only on knowledge of the 
game’s structure but also on identical conjectures about 
what all other players will do. The NE criterion pertains to 
whether each player is choosing a strategy that is a best 
response to a shared conjecture about the strategies of all 
players. A set of strategies satisfies the criterion when all 
player strategies are best responses to the shared 
conjecture. In many widely used refinements of the NE 
concept, such as subgame perfection and perfect Bayesian, 
the inferential criteria also require players to have shared, 
or at least very similar, conjectures” [23: 103-104].  NE is, 
at its core, a cognitive theory.   
  In cognitive science, “theory of mind” refers to our 
amazing disposition to attribute mindedness to other 
human beings. Classical economics takes theory of mind 
for granted, and extends it to the view that all of those 
minds are driven by consistent preferences and beliefs to 
consistent actions. Behavioral game theory applies patches 
to come up with a conception of individual minds as 
consistently deviant from classical rationality. Hence the 
phrase “predictably irrational.” The difference between 
classical rationality and behavioral game theory is not 
about consistency: classical rationality assumes that 
everyone is consistent in the same way, while behavioral 
game theory assumes that each person is consistent in a 
certain “deviant” way. While classical rationality and 
behavioral game theory are often taken to be opposed, we 
seem them as uniformly based on an assumption of 
consistency that does not stand with experimental test.  
  Some scholars justify consistency as a mathematical 
shortcut that is meant to represent the result of some 
unspecified learning, evolutionary adjustment process, or 
the adoption of social norms, laws or institutions [34]. 
These processes, however, are rarely defined. This line of 
reasoning also implies that beliefs and choices will not be 
consistent if players do not have time to learn or evolve. 
  As in many related experiments [for a survey see 8], 
subjects in our experiments do indeed deviate from SPNE 
predictions, both in their actions and in their beliefs. We 
also demonstrate that subjects’ recursive beliefs (beliefs 
about the beliefs of other players) are often inconsistent 
with NE predictions, a result that has not been widely 
appreciated.  We show further that the variance in actions 
and beliefs is very large.   
Even the common patches of behavioral game theory 
do not predict the tremendous diversity that we observed 
for individual subjects and the variance across subjects’ 
beliefs and behavior. Subjects’ reported beliefs and their 
behavior are regularly incongruent – subjects who play 
consistently with NE prediction do not always possess the 
assumed game theoretic beliefs. Furthermore, subjects’ 
beliefs differ across settings even when there are no 
changes in the cognitive complexity of the setting. Taken 
together these results suggest that game theoretic models 
and common modifications employed to make them 
explain the deviations from straightforward NE, do not 
accurately predict the variations in behaviors we observe in 
a laboratory setting. Therefore, research into decision-
making should turn to discovering the cognitive patterns of 
decision-making. 
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